This paper considers a secure and practical CRT-based RSA signature implementation against both side channel attacks (including power analysis attack, timing attack, and most specially the recent MRED attack) as well as the various CRT-based fault attacks. Moreover, the proposed countermeasure can resist C safe-error attack which can be mounted in many existing good countermeasures. To resist side-channel attack, a special design of random message blinding is employed. On the other hand, a countermeasure based on the idea of fault diffusion is developed to protect the implementation against the powerful CRT-based fault attacks. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.
CITATION STYLE
Kim, C. K., Ha, J. C., Moon, S. J., Yen, S. M., & Kim, S. H. (2005). A CRT-based RSA countermeasure against physical cryptanalysis. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3726 LNCS, pp. 549–554). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11557654_64
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.