Worst-case nash equilibria in restricted routing

3Citations
Citations of this article
1Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

We study a restricted related model of the network routing problem. There are m parallel links with possibly different speeds, between a source and a sink. And there are n users, and each user i has a traffic of weight w i to assign to one of the links from a subset of all the links, named his/her allowable set. We analyze the Price of Anarchy (denoted by PoA) of the system, which is the ratio of the maximum delay in the worst-case Nash equilibrium and in an optimal solution. In order to better understand this model, we introduce a parameter λ for the system, and define an instance to be λ-good if for every user, there exist a link with speed at least in his/her allowable set. In this paper, we prove that for λ-good instances, the Price of Anarchy is . We also show an important application of our result in coordination mechanism design for task scheduling game. We propose a new coordination mechanism, Group-Makespan, for unrelated selfish task scheduling game. Our new mechanism ensures the existence of pure Nash equilibrium and its PoA is . This result improves the best known result of O(log2 m) by Azar, Jain and Mirrokni in [2]. © 2008 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Lu, P., & Yu, C. (2008). Worst-case nash equilibria in restricted routing. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5385 LNCS, pp. 231–238). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_30

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free