The 'new synthesis in moral psychology' versus Aristotelianism. Content and consequences

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to explore the social consequences of recent developments in moral psychology aimed at psychologizing morality: developments that Jonathan Haidt terms 'the new synthesis' (NS). As a prelude, I diagnose what in the content of the NS undergirds those consequences and how it differs from the Aristotelian alternatives with which it is commonly contrasted. More specifically, I explore the NS's take on moral ontology, moral motivation, moral ecology and moral domains. In all cases, I deem the response offered by the NS to radical rationalism hyperbolic and argue that Aristotelianism provides a more plausible, if more moderate, alternative. In the final section, I address the putative social consequences of the NS, both general consequences for public conceptions of the moral life and more specific consequences for moral education at school. In both cases, I argue that the consequences of adopting the NS position range from the unfortunate to the outright pernicious.