Abstract
Market mechanisms play a key role in allocating and pricing commuters and drivers in new on-demand transport services such as Uber, and Liftago in Prague. These services successfully use different mechanisms, which suggests a need to understand the behavior of a range of mechanisms within the context of on-demand transport. In this paper, we propose a double auction mechanism and compare its performance to a mechanism inspired by Liftago’s approach. We show that our mechanism can improve efficiency and satisfy key properties such as weak budget balance and truthfulness.
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CITATION STYLE
Egan, M., Schaefer, M., Jakob, M., & Oren, N. (2015). A double auction mechanism for on-demand transport networks. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9387, pp. 557–565). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8_38
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