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CEO Incentive Provision in Cooperatives: The Impact of Membership Size and Heterogeneity

Springer, (2013), 171-178
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7908-2867-2_10
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Abstract

A multi-task principal-agent model is formulated to capture the effect of membership size and heterogeneity on the incentive provision of the CEO in a cooperative. An increase in membership size as well as an increase in member heterogeneity decreases the optimal incentive intensity of the CEO.

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Feng, L., & Hendrikse, G. (2013). CEO Incentive Provision in Cooperatives: The Impact of Membership Size and Heterogeneity. In Contributions to Management Science (pp. 171–178). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2867-2_10

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