A mix is a communication proxy that attempts to hide the correspondence between its incoming and outgoing messages. Timing attacks are a significant challenge for mix-based systems that wish to support interactive, low-latency applications. However, the potency of these attacks has not been studied carefully. In this paper, we investigate timing analysis attacks on low-latency mix systems and clarify the threat they pose. We propose a novel technique, defensive dropping, to thwart timing attacks. Through simulations and analysis, we show that defensive dropping can be effective against attackers who employ timing analysis. © IFCA/Springer-Verlag 2004.
CITATION STYLE
Levine, B. N., Reiter, M. K., Wang, C., & Wright, M. (2004). Timing attacks in low-latency mix systems (Extended Abstract). Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 3110, 251–265. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27809-2_25
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