The results of a recent survey on the philosophical views of contemporary, mainly Anglo-Saxon professional philosophers have shown that a supposed predominance of physicalist reductionist positions in the philosophy of neurosciences is far from unanimous. This paper explores one possible philosophical position rooting a non-physicalist reductionist conception of mind. It suggests and argues that a classical philosophical frame, Aristotelian hylomorphism, provides adequate non-reductionist answers that do not fall into dualisms. Finally, it offers the corresponding conclusions.
CITATION STYLE
Crespo, R. F. (2017). Aristotelian hylomorphism: A framework for non-physicalist philosophers about philosophy of mind. In Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update (Vol. 2, pp. 37–46). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53126-7_4
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