Digital signatures constructed solely from hash functions offer competitive signature sizes and fast signing and verifying times. Moreover, the security of hash functions against a quantum adversary is believed to be well understood. This means that hash-based signatures are strong candidates for standard use in a post-quantum world. The Leighton-Micali signature scheme (LMS) is one such scheme being considered for standardization. However all systematic analyses of LMS have only considered a classical adversary. In this work we close this gap by showing a proof of the security of LMS in the quantum random-oracle model. Our results match the bounds imposed by Grover’s search algorithm within a constant factor, and remain tight in the multi-user setting.
CITATION STYLE
Eaton, E. (2018). Leighton-micali hash-based signatures in the quantum random-oracle model. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10719 LNCS, pp. 263–280). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72565-9_13
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