We show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks when instantiated with a family of pseudo random functions. Compared to previous results, which require a collision resistant hash function, our result provides significantly smaller signatures at the same security level. We also consider security in the strong sense and show that the Winternitz one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable assuming additional properties of the pseudo random function. In this context we formally define several key-based security notions for function families and investigate their relation to pseudorandomness. All our reductions are exact and in the standard model and can directly be used to estimate the output length of the hash function required to meet a certain security level. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Buchmann, J., Dahmen, E., Ereth, S., Hülsing, A., & Rückert, M. (2011). On the security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6737 LNCS, pp. 363–378). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21969-6_23
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