The Double Sense of the Law-Dignity Relationship in Emmanuel Levinas

Abstract

Dignity can result from an intrinsic quality: the dignity of a gaze, the face, associated with the single individual’s intrinsic value, with singularity, with the I’s respect for the other as other, even before the advent of positive law; or, it can derive from a social condition demanding respect, even obedience from others, dignity connected with a high office, with authority, social position. The law defends a role, social position, juridical position, an authority that is elected, nominated, inherited; the law defends the law itself; the law is law and is respected as such; dignity is the law itself. This double “position” of the law, this dual law-dignity relationship is a constant object of reflection by philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) throughout his writings, and is developed in this chapter around the following themes: dignity and responsibility; the relationship of reciprocal implication between “law”and “dignity”; original peace and authority of the face; when respect of the law becomes effacement of the other; freedom ensuing from responsibility for the other to the point of “substitution”; language, subjectivity, justice; language, face and ethics; the finite and the infinite; justice and signification; law as original recognition of the right of others; justice and responsibility; ambivalences of the face; body, algorithm and responsibility in the digital world; human rights, the problem of freedom and self consciousness; from need to desire; justice, love, saintliness; Levinas and Bakhtin for a humanism of the other; a view from semiotics; the relation to the other and semioethics.