Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms are still vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks that are based on multiple measurements of the same operation can be countered by employing masking techniques. In the presence of glitches, most of the currently known masking techniques still leak information during the computation of non-linear functions. We discuss a recently introduced masking method which is based on secret sharing and results in implementations that are provable resistant against first-order side- channel attacks, even in the presence of glitches. We reduce the hardware requirements of this method and show how to derive provable secure implementations of some non-linear building blocks for cryptographic algorithms. Finally, we provide a provable secure implementation of the block cipher Noekeon and verify the results. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009.
CITATION STYLE
Nikova, S., Rijmen, V., & Schläffer, M. (2009). Secure hardware implementation of non-Linear functions in the presence of glitches. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5461, pp. 218–234). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00730-9_14
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.