Abstract
We investigate here several categories of strategic games and antagonistic situations that are known to admit potential functions, and are thus guaranteed to either possess pure Nash equilibria or to stabilize in some form of equilibrium in cases of stochastic potentials. Our goal is to indicate the generality of this method and to address its limits. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
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CITATION STYLE
Spirakis, P. G., & Panagopoulou, P. N. (2013). Potential functions in strategic games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7913 LNCS, pp. 283–297). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38536-0_25
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