This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013.We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information onthe use of government guarantees on banks' assets and liabilities, including during the recent globalfinancial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurancescheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurancehas become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, whichalso triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bankassets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insuranceremains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
CITATION STYLE
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Kane, E., & Laeven, L. (2014). Deposit Insurance Database. IMF Working Papers, 14(118), 1. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498354479.001
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