Side-channel attacks are effective attacks against modern cryptographic schemes, which exploit the leaking information besides input and output to the algorithm. As one of the cache-based side-channel attacks, Flush+Reload features high resolution, low noise, and virtual machine compatibility. However, a state-of-the-art Flush+Reload attack only reveals whether the memory address is accessed or not. This paper presents differential Flush+Reload attack that can recover the access sequence of memory addresses, which could lead to new vulnerabilities. The idea is to analyze statistical difference among multiple Flush+Reload results. Specifically, we add controlled delay between the start of victim calculation and the memory flush. Multiple Flush+Reload results with different delays are measured to determine the memory access sequence. Under this concept, we demonstrate the details of a successful recovery of T-table access sequences for an AES implementation from MatrixSSL version 3.9.3 on an Intel CPU.
CITATION STYLE
Yuan, Z., Li, Y., Sakiyama, K., Sugawara, T., & Wang, J. (2018). Recovering memory access sequence with differential flush+reload attack. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11125 LNCS, pp. 424–439). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99807-7_26
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