EU enlargement and the constitutional principle of judicial independence

Abstract

In this chapter, the issue of judicial independence in the accession process was examined, and it was argued that any claim that the Commission assessment of the legal systems of the accession countries has been based on a coherent theory of judicial independence is deeply problematic. Despite the lack of such a theory, factors diverse as the dominant intellectual understanding of the nature of the Union and pragmatic considerations in the negotiations process, have presupposed the construction of a certain myth of such a coherent theory. The chapter examined some of the uses of this myth and the costs related to these uses. The issue of judicial independence was a tiny aspect of the accession process. Therefore, one should be careful in generalizing on the basis of the finding of this study. Yet, it seems what has been said for the issue of judicial independence might have some relevance for the assessment of the accession process in general. © 2006 Springer.