Skip to main content
Conference ProceedingsOPEN ACCESS

Search engine ad auctions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (2008) 5385 LNCS 13
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_5
0Citations
Citations of this article
3Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

Auctions for search engine advertising have been one of the most successful examples of economic mechanism design, at least in the private sector. This talk will review some of the history, theory, and practical issues surrounding these auctions. © 2008 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Varian, H. R. (2008). Search engine ad auctions. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5385 LNCS, p. 13). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_5

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free