Conclusion

Abstract

Before 2011, global powers wanted to eliminate the threat from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and secure freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab but concluded they should work with regional powers, notably Saudi Arabia, which had greatest interest in a stable Yemen and some (declining) capacity to influence the country’s politics. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) deal of 2011 was seen by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a continuation of the existing system without President Saleh in office, while the five permanent members of the UN Security Council saw it as a chance to build a stable reformed regime able to eliminate terrorism. Once the transition government collapsed and the war started in early 2015, external powers gave priority to their interests in Saudi Arabia and its coalition partner, the UAE, while trying to manage growing domestic opposition due to the war’s humanitarian consequences. Throughout the political crisis and war, global and regional powers had to work with Yemeni actors who prioritized their own interests, often frustrating the aims of external powers. The interplay of global, regional, and local dynamics brought catastrophe to a fragmenting Yemen-enabling Iran to increase its influence while creating the opportunity for a much-degraded, but still active AQAP to revive.