Is It Time to Abandon the Strong Interpretation of the Dual-Process Model in Neuroethics?

Abstract

Pioneering neuroimaging studies in the “neuroscience of ethics” (Greene et al. 2001) have led to the development of the dual-process model of moral judgment (Greene 2008). These studies have also provided the much-needed impetus for neuroethics itself, having inspired a range of empirical studies on moral judgment (see Christensen and Gomila 2012) and conceptual analyses in ethics informed by neuroscience (see Levy 2007; Racine 2010; Glannon 2007, 2011). However useful dual-process model has been in the past, mounting empirical counterevidence (Koenigs et al. 2007; Duke and Begue 2015), and the conceptual implications of fallibilism lead to a conclusion that this model should be shelved as neuroethics moves forward.Fallibilism as a pragmatic attitude emanates from the logic and spirit of science: scientific inquiry and progress actually mean overthrowing previously established beliefs and tentatively establishing new beliefs based on science (Dewey 1929). When this is applied to the study of moral judgment, it yields a drastically different picture from the one painted by champions of the dual-system model in moral decision-making: moral beliefs are fallible (no matter how fast we might reach them), have the logical status of hypotheses, and do not provide absolute certainty. For example, utilitarian calculus, though deliberate and slow, is as open to biases as an approach using heuristics. The point is that fallibility needs to be recognized in all endeavors, whether they are guided by quick intuitive processes or by time-consuming and explicit reasoning.