The ECB Governing Council in an enlarged euro area

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Abstract

We study the impact of rotating votes in the ECB Governing Council after EMU enlargement, based on national and euro-wide Taylor rules and on a convergence assumption. We find that the rotation system yields monetary policy decisions that are close both to full centralization and to a voting rule without rotations. © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Bénassy-Quéré, A., & Turkisch, E. (2009). The ECB Governing Council in an enlarged euro area. Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(1), 25–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.01832.x

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