The concept of freedom in the ḥAnafī school: Freedom in relation to interests and right

Abstract

The paper demonstrates that the notion of freedom played an important role in Islamic legislation. “Freedom” transformed from being a general concept in the Ḥanafī School to a well-defined concept with a scope that covers social, economic, family, political and judicial aspects. The concept also played a central role in dealing with issues of public interests/welfare (maṣāliḥ) and rights (ḥuqūq). This article argues that the Ḥanafī notion of freedom is based on three pillars. The first pillar consists of interpreting public interests/welfare in terms of freedoms and benefits, which granted the notion of freedom a pivotal role in legislation and the methododology of legal/ independent reasoning (ijtihād). The second pillar entails its use to provide the logical foundations for “fundamental human rights,” through the triangle of life, freedom and property. The notion was subsequently used to link freedom to the merits of humanity, and was considered to be a warranty for the wellness and the wellbeing of societies as well as the wisdom behind the creation of humankind and the revelation of Divine law (sharīʿa). The third pillar is based on a network of key concepts that define the notion of freedom and its scope: durability, humanity, trusteeship, [public] interest, worship, reason and power.