Obama and Iran: Explaining Policy Change

Abstract

Under the terms of the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) accepted a range of con-straints on its nuclear program, along with an intrusive inspection regime, in return for acknowledgment of its right to enrich uranium and the gradual lifting of sanctions. 1 This agreement marked an end to 12 years of failed negotiations and was welcomed as a major breakthrough vir-tually everywhere in the world except among hard-line conservatives in both Iran and the USA. Whether it marked the start of a fundamental re-orientation of US–Iranian relations remains an open question, and one which will be considered briefl y at the end of this chapter. That it repre-sented a signifi cant change in those relations, and in US policy toward Iran is, however, unquestionable. US policy toward the Iranian nuclear program under George W. Bush was clear: Iran would not be allowed to enrich uranium under any circumstances and the administration would not negotiate with Tehran until it complied with all of the demands of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 2 Under Obama there was an incremental retreat from these positions. Iran was fi rstly offered negotia-tions without preconditions, 3 and then an acknowledgment that it would be allowed to enrich once it had satisfi ed the international community that it had no nuclear weapons program. 4 Finally, under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran was permitted to continue to enrich even as that process of verifi cation occurred. This chapter focuses on the change in US policy and the question of why the Obama administration decided to abandon the demand that Iran forego the right to enrich. Drawing on the literature on foreign policy change, it is argued that a combination of four key variables accounts for this, namely, the repeated failure of existing policy and the likelihood of catastrophic confl ict if that policy was continued, Obama's recognition and acceptance of that policy failure, the emergence of a viable alternative policy and the " multilateralization " of US policy toward Iran. The chapter is divided into three sections. In the fi rst we examine the various factors that underpin the tendency to inertia in foreign policy, and show how these infl uenced US policy toward Iran. In the second we demonstrate how the coincidence of the four variables described above nevertheless led to policy change under Obama. Finally, we consider the implications of this change, whether the nuclear deal is likely to hold and whether it might serve as the basis of a wider improvement in US–Iranian relations.