Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) is an important cryptographic tool to establish a confidential channel between two or more entities over a public network. Various AKE protocols utilize smart cards to store sensitive contents which are normally used for authentication or session key generation. It assumed that smart cards come with a tamperresistant property, but sensitive contents stored in it can still be extracted by side channel attacks. It means that if an adversary steals someones smart card, he may have chance to impersonate this victim or further launch another attacks. This kind of attack is called Stolen Smart Card Attack. In this paper, we propose a three-party password authentication key exchange protocol. Our design is secure against the stolen smart card attack. We also provide a security analysis to show our protocol is still secure if sensitive information which is stored in a smart card is extracted by an attacker.
CITATION STYLE
Chen, C. M., Xu, L., Fang, W., & Wu, T. Y. (2017). A three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol resistant to stolen smart card attacks. In Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies (Vol. 63, pp. 331–336). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50209-0_40
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