Abstract
Roscoe recently showed how HISPs, a class of protocol to allow humans to contribute to the creation of secure authentic channels between them, can be made auditable in the sense that a failed attack on them cannot be disguised as communication failure. In this paper we study the same issue for PAKEs: password authenticated key exchange protocols. We find that because this second style of protocol relies on long term state, it is harder to make them auditable, and that to do so we have to develop new ideas on how to approximate fair exchange without a TTP.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Roscoe, A. W., & Ryan, P. Y. A. (2017). Auditable PAKEs: Approaching fair exchange without a TTP. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10476 LNCS, pp. 278–297). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71075-4_31
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