An efficient structural attack on NIST submission DAGS

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Abstract

We present an efficient key recovery attack on code based encryption schemes using some quasi-dyadic alternant codes with extension degree 2. This attack permits to break the proposal DAGS recently submitted to NIST.

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APA

Barelli, É., & Couvreur, A. (2018). An efficient structural attack on NIST submission DAGS. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11272 LNCS, pp. 93–118). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03326-2_4

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