Lack of Universality of a Psychological Problem: Epistemological Implications on Psychological Problems

Abstract

The article claims that psychological problems cannot be defined by universally meaningful psychological or philosophical scientific terminology, which leads one to consider the actual reality of psychological problems from the universal epistemological viewpoint of ordinary people. In other words, can we as laypeople or professionals reasonably claim our reality and justifiable epistemic beliefs based on the notion of a psychological problem? If psychological problems cannot be universally real beyond an idiosyncratic sense, this has important implications on how to reflect upon resolving them. Universally grounded epistemological solutions provide a sound basis to reflect upon resolving psychological problems without formal training, and the unary notion of psychological problem as such, without universal descriptive intentions, is considered with regard to (a) its common sense linguistic value as a proto-epistemic concept in the context of psychologic as a theory and (b) its promising psychological and philosophical Gegenstand functional value as a notion to reflect against.