Factoring disjunction out of deontic modal puzzles

Abstract

Ross's puzzle (Ross, 1941) and the paradox of Free Choice Permission (Kamp, 1973), puzzles involving disjunction under deontic operators, have received wide discussion in recent work in natural language semantics. First, I contrast two opposed modal views - call them the "box-diamond" theory and EU theory - that form two poles of the contemporary debate. The opposition between them is underwritten by distinct, well-developed conceptions of what it is for an action to be good. I present an axiomatization of obligation and permissibility - of 'ought' and 'may' - that is neutral between the two theories. Adding in the interpretation of 'or' as Boolean union, we get the received dialectic in the literature between the two theories on explaining Ross and FCP. Factoring out this assumption, we get a picture of how far apart the two theories are as theories of value, with no questions begged about the semantics of sentential disjunction. © 2014 Springer International Publishing.