Conclusion

Abstract

There were three major systems developments in the nuclear weapons field which formed the basis of the decision making in the 1976–1979 Labour government of James Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher's first Conservative government from 1979–1983. The first was the highly controversial Chevaline upgrade to the Royal Navy's Polaris force. The second was what successor system was needed to replace Polaris in the mid-1990s. This eventually led to the procurement of first the Trident C-4 SLBM in 1980 and then the adoption of the more powerful D-5 variant in 1982. The third was the contentious and divisive decision to deploy Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in Britain in November 1983; a result of the December 1979 `dual track' decision by NATO. With fixed-based American nuclear weapons not permanently stationed in the UK since Thor medium-range missiles were removed in 1963, the decision caused a storm of controversy. This controversy combined with the public announcements of Chevaline and Trident to produce the greatest upsurge in anti-nuclear sentiment not witnessed in Britain for 20 years. It also led to accusations, particularly amongst the Labour Party's left-wing, that Britain was becoming a nuclear basing facility for the Americans and no longer independent in nuclear weapons policy.1