The war against terrorism and the war against terrorism

Abstract

Whether the appropriate response to a terrorist attack is to declare (literal) war on terrorism or to conduct a (metaphorical) "war" against terrorism - or both - depends in large measure on the nature of the terrorist threat. The question is potentially controversial because views can differ dramatically both about the sources of the kinds of terrorism that pose a threat and about the kinds of strategy that may be called for to neutralize the threat. Despite such differences, however, it ought to be a matter of agreement that ideally the grand objective to be served both by military and by nonmilitary strategies for combating terrorism is the prevention of terrorism. Advocates of a (literal) war against terrorism, no less than those who stress the need for a (metaphorical) "war" against terrorism, would be in no position to claim victory in the fight against terrorism if they had to concede, at the end of the day, that, despite their best efforts to anticipate or respond to particular terrorist attacks, they had been unable to reduce to reasonably manageable proportions the more serious forms of the long-term threat of terrorism. It may of course be unrealistic to hope that the threat can be wholly eliminated. Nevertheless, not even to aim at the prevention of terrorism is to be indefensibly unambitious. But if the grander objective - prevention of terrorism; elimination of the terrorist threat - is to be kept alive, importance obviously attaches to serious efforts to understand the sources of terrorism. Defensible strategies both in the war against terrorism and in the "war" against terrorism must be informed by the best available information about the causes of terrorism. If this is to be achieved, it is important not only for the search for the best explanations to take fully seriously the myriad forms terrorism either does or could assume but also for recognition to be given to the potentially very diverse conditions that can facilitate the emergence (and persistence) of terrorism. To ask how the threat of terrorism is to be combated defensibly and effectively (whether by military or by nonmilitary means, or by both) - that is, to ask how defensible and effective strategies are to be identified for the prevention of terrorism - is different from asking (merely) about what the response ought to be to particular acts of terrorism. It is different, in part, because the latter question arises only in the wake of terrorist attacks, whereas it is possible to raise the former question even when no terrorist attack has yet taken place. But even when the asking of the question about strategies for the prevention of terrorism is triggered by the fact that a terrorist attack has already occurred, it is one thing to ask what response would be appropriate while assuming that the preferred response will be one that contributes to the prevention of terrorism and another thing to ask about the appropriate response without making this assumption. The two questions are different because asking how future terrorist attacks are to be prevented need not be what is emphasized by those who are trying to decide how to respond to a particular terrorist attack. Instead, the emphasis may simply be on ensuring that there is a retaliatory strike at the terrorists. Even if this kind of retaliatory response could be justified on strictly retributive grounds - and it is plausible to think that a measured retributive response is bound to be even more difficult to achieve in this kind of context than it is when penalties are being meted out in a court of law - to assign too much importance to trying to ensure that the perpetrators of terrorist acts get what they deserve is to divert attention from a more urgent task, the task of trying to reduce the threat of terrorism. Of course those whose priority it is to retaliate may suppose that a primarily retributive response is also an effective way of deterring further attacks. However, this further claim is subject to challenge.1 Not only is there a real possibility that focusing on retaliation will mean that potentially more effective preventive strategies are overlooked, but the retaliatory strategy may itself increase the risk of further terrorist attacks: a fundamentally retaliatory response often generates a spiraling cycle of violence that merely heightens, instead of diminishing, the threat of terrorism. And if, as is often the case, the retaliatory response is, at least in part, wrongly targeted - with those who are not themselves terrorists (or terrorist supporters) being among the principal victims of the response - the retaliatory response may have to be characterized both as counterproductive from the standpoint of prevention of terrorism and as itself morally indefensible. A merely (or principally) retaliatory response to a terrorist attack is thus perilous. Even if the retaliation could be represented, fairly, as the sort of measured and well-targeted response against the perpetrators of the terrorist act that they might be said to deserve - an extremely demanding condition (in part, because of its obscurity) - the fit may in any case be poor between such a response and one that is carefully calculated to prevent the recurrence of such acts. When decision-makers are trying to respond in a way that will prevent terrorist acts in the future, not only will they find that the strategies they must consider are not limited to those that might be thought to give the terrorists what they deserve; they may also find that maximally effective preventive strategies are actually in conflict with those suggested by retributive considerations. © 2007 Springer.