Constructivism and existential phenomenology: two moments within postrationalist epistemology

Abstract

The so-called postrationalist approach emerges against the way in which traditional cognitivism conceptualizes the relationship between subject and reality. Defining the self as a bio-psychological phenomenon, Vittorio Guidano's proposal has become the most popular formulation of the model. Unfortunately, the sudden passing of Guidano left several conceptual issues opened within the model. After identifying the main aspects of the approach, this paper identifies two moments in Guidano's model. (i) The first stage, strongly influenced by constructivism and traditional enactivism, defines the self as emerging in the recursive relationship between organism and environment defined by the need for survival. We shall call this moment Guidano 1. This stage has been the target of most literature on the topic. (ii) The second stage (Guidano 2) is the product of a turn towards existential-phenomenology. Here, the relationship between self and reality is not only organized around survival, but also, around the sense of the organism's own existence. Importantly, this later moment has been largely neglected in the literature, so, after critically examining it, we conclude by clarifying the type of phenomenological analysis that would guide clinical practice from the perspective of the second moment in the model.