A new idea of reality: Pauli on the unity of mind and matter

Abstract

Here are two representative but somewhat cryptic remarks of Wolfgang Pauli on the relation of mind and matter: "physis and psyche are probably two aspects of one and the same abstract fact" and ".. a mirror-image principle is a natural way to give an illustrative representation of the psychophysical relationship."1 Although the general idea of a "dual-aspect" account of the relation between mind and matter is the obvious content of these remarks, two particular questions spring to mind. The first is, why does Pauli say that mind and matter are aspects of an "abstract" fact and the second is, how seriously does Pauli intend the mirror image analogy. A serious use implies some strong and quite radical conclusions about the nature of mind, which may also help us to understand what Pauli intended by reference to abstract facts. There are any number of problems and issues that arise in the philosophy of mind but two main strands of thought can be distinguished which characterize Pauli's interests. One is a concern with the operation of the mind. This can be regarded as an empirical issue addressed by psychology, but it also has a philosophical aspect. Philosophers have an interest in the dynamics of mental states, the appropriate categorization of mental states and, perhaps most especially, the contents of mental states. A quick caricature of the typical approach to this issue can be given with belief-desire theory. On this view the mind is-to a crude first approximation-described in terms of two core states, one whose function is to represent the way the world is, and the other to represent the way the world should become (according to the subject). Mental dynamics is the evolution of the belief-desire system in light of the continually changing environment as the subject pursues his or her desires. More sophisticated accounts increase the number of distinct mental states and provide for more fine-grained characterizations of their contents but the basic idea is clear enough. The belief-desire scheme is very abstract and all sorts of activity fall under it-from the behavior of quite simple animals to that of not so simple physicists. While Pauli was no cognitive scientist he did have a very keen interest in this aspect of the problem of mind which he famously approached from the perspective of C.G. Jung's archetypal psychology. He wrote extensively on this subject. Pauli's (1952) study of the genesis of Kepler's scientific ideas provides a lengthy and deeply worked out example of the application of Jung's ideas to the psychological dynamics involved in scientific theorizing (of which more below). The second strand of thought is more purely philosophical. It is the metaphysical or ontological question of the ultimate nature of mind and its place in nature. On this topic Pauli had definite views but wrote nothing systematic or extensive. Rather, his writing is fragmentary, largely taking the form of suggestive comments occurring sporadically in writing on other subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to assemble at least a framework of a theory about the relation of mind and matter which Pauli would endorse (though it is impossible to know in any detail how Pauli would have liked the theory to be extended). This task has been most notably undertaken in Atmanspacher and Primas (2006). Instead of replicating their exemplary efforts, I want to trace out a possible argumentative path from Pauli's understanding of quantum physics to the philosophy of mind. To begin, since Pauli's view falls under the general heading of a dual-aspect theory and such theories have a long history, it is worth briefly exploring their philosophical ancestry.