The Presidentialization of Japan’s LDP Politics: Analyzing Its Causes, Limits, and Perils

Abstract

This article examines the elevated status of the prime minister in the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government through the lens of Poguntke and Webb’s presidentialization thesis. There are two distinctive characteristics in the Japanese case. First, its presidentialization does not occur as the evolution of the Westminster model and instead follows a unique path. Second, the reinforced position of the Japanese premiership is in essence the product of institutional reforms that the Japanese political class has enacted in the last two decades for the renewal of national strategies, which in turn means that the Japanese presidentialization is taking place by design at its core. Furthermore, the latter fact implies its potential risks—most importantly, the progress of presidentialization under the LDP’s continued dominance can undermine check-and-balance functions in Japanese democracy to a hazardous degree.