Neuroethics and Nanoethics: Do We Risk Ethical Myopia?

Abstract

In recent years, two distinct trajectories of bioethical inquiry have emerged: neuroethics and nano-ethics. The former deals with issues in neuroscience, whereas the latter deals with issues in nanoscience and nanotechnology. In both cases, the ethical inquiries have coalesced in response to rapidly increasing scientific and engineering developments in each field. Both also present major issues for contemplation in bioethics. However, the questions are (1) how different are the ethical issues raised, and (2) is it beneficial for neuro-ethics and nanoethics inquiries to proceed on often-divergent trajectories by ethicists who otherwise might never interact? If, for example, ethical inquiry occurs only within the disciplinary confines of their predom-inant area(s) of science (which now seems to be the case) or by overlooking prior discussions in other scientific realms (like genetics), then the opportunity for a richer, more comprehensive discourse may be lost. I argue that this (1) is a disservice to bioethics, (2) is antithetical to some of the aims of bioethical inquiry, and (3) encourages the reductionism bioethicists' claim that is counterproductive. In recent years, two distinct trajectories of bioethical inquiry have emerged: neuroethics and nanoethics. The former deals with issues in neuroscience (the study of the brain and the nervous system) while the latter deals with issues in nanoscience and nanotechnology (an applied science focused on the design, synthesis, characterization, and application of materials and devices on a sub-atomic scale). In both cases, the ethical inquiries have coalesced in response to rapidly increasing scientific and engineering developments in each field. Both also present major issues for contem-plation in bioethics. Moreover, the ethical issues each raises have been pursued largely independently of one another, which suggests that these issues in each case are somehow categorically unique to each context. This independent consideration could be justified only if, in fact, this were the case, and that nothing would be gained by ethicists interacting with those addressing ethical issues from each context. This article attempts to address the validity of this approach by examining what is meant by " neuroethics " and " nanoethics, " what sorts of applications in each of the principal scientific domains raise ethical concerns, what is driving the subdivision of these ethical inquiries, and the con-sequences of separating the inquiries.