Reference and reference-fixing in pure quotation

Abstract

Cory Washington has identified three questions that a theory of pure quotation should address, and on the basis of which such theories could be classified: (i) what part of a quotation has a referring role, (ii) what the reference of that referring part is, and (iii) how that reference is fixed. This paper compares the answers given by the demonstrative, Davidsonian account that I have previously advocated with those provided by what I regard as the most interesting alternative to have emerged in recent years: the “disquotational” Tarski-inspired account advocated by Gomez-Torrente and others. This paper develops three points. First, the Demonstrative Theory, together with plausible independent principles, does entail that, in default contexts, the (“semantic”) referent of a quotation is the linguistic type of the token quoted. The theory explains in this way why instances of Gomez-Torrente’s “Interiority Principle” are by default true, even if not “as a matter of meaning alone”. Second, the theory provides the same account for reference-determination in non-default cases, in which “semantic” referents differ from linguistic types. Unlike Gomez-Torrente’s principle, the theory does without a specific general naming convention to account for the determination of the semantic referents of quotations. Finally, the issues dividing the Demonstrative and Disquotational theories are not verbal, but substantive, and in principle amenable to empirical resolution.