Epistemic Virtues of Institutions

Abstract

In everyday speech, we don’t only attribute virtues and vices to individuals, but also to institutions. In doing so, we implicitly assume that these collective entities are certain kinds of agents, the bearers of epistemic features – states, attitudes, beliefs, actions or like – for which they can be blamed or applauded. In this paper, I will inquire how we can responsibly ascribe epistemic features to institutions, and assess the meaning of attributing virtues and vices to institutions. These questions require a more comprehensive investigation of whether those collective entities should be regarded as collective agents, whom we can attribute with virtues and vices. My interest lies with the following questions: What makes an institution a collective agent, or what makes it a collective epistemic agent? Does an institution display epistemic virtues as an epistemically autonomous collective, or as a cluster of virtuous individuals? What, precisely, makes an institution an epistemically virtuous collective agent? I will argue in favour of the following claims: (i) as a social entity, an institution is an autonomous collective epistemic agent (ii) being an epistemic agent, the intellectual virtues (vices) displayed by institutions are identical to those displayed by individual agents, (iii) the virtues (vices) displayed by an institution as a whole should not be reduced to the virtues (vices) of its virtuous (vicious) members, that is, a virtuous institution is not (necessarily) an institution of virtuous individuals (and vice versa). Finally, I will offer the preliminary stance that an epistemically virtuous institution is an institution which applies scientific knowledge (knowledge about what is real) in everyday life (knowledge about how to act) in order to improve the quality of overall life for all (knowledge about what is good or bad for citizens).