The Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions: The Structure of Arguments about Fallacies

  • Goodwin D
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Abstract

Arguments about fallacies generally attempt to distinguish real from apparent modes of argumentation and reasoning. To examine the structure of these arguments, this paper develops a theory of dialectical distinction. First, it explores the connection between Nicholas Rescher's concept of distinction as a "dialectical countermove" and Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrecht-Tyteca's "dissociation of ideas." Next, it applies a theory of distinction to Aristotle's extended arguments about fallacies in De Sophisticis Elenchis, primarily with a view to analyzing its underlying strategies of argumentation. Finally, it examines how second-order distinctions (those designed to challenge previously formulated distinctions) underpin current arguments against the Aristotelian or "Standard Treatment" of the fallacies.

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Goodwin, D. (1992). The Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions: The Structure of Arguments about Fallacies. Informal Logic, 14(1). https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v14i1.2522

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