Corporate Intentions

Abstract

Peter French is one of the most discussed advocates for the position that corporations are moral agents. He regards the corporate entity itself as a moral agent that is logically distinct from its members. This position may be contrasted with other views that attribute moral agency and responsibility to the corporation as a collective whole of structured individual members. This difference becomes an important one because it distinguishes if corporate moral responsibility attributions refer to the corporate entity or its members (either individually or collectively). As we shall see later on I do believe that certain corporate moral responsibility attributions are legitimate when they implicitly refer to its members, but that it is imperative that we reject any such attributions to corporate entities themselves as logically distinct from their members. French’s position is widely discussed due to its extreme nature but not widely held for the same reason. However, French is a good starting point because his controversial view helps to highlight some of the main issues at stake in this debate. I shall explicate French’s position of corporate moral agency which will involve presenting his views on the conditions for moral agency. I will then criticise French’s position in the light of the necessary conditions for moral agency which will help to further specify the morally relevant sense of the intention and autonomy conditions for moral agency.