Secure and privacy-preserving location proof in database-driven cognitive radio networks

Abstract

The latest FCC ruling has enforced database-driven cognitive radio networks (CRNs), in which all secondary users (SUs) can query a database to obtain spectrum available information (SAI). Database-driven CRNs is regarded as a promising approach for dynamic and highly efficient spectrum management paradigm. However, as a typical location-based service (LBS), there is no verification of the queried location, which is very vulnerable to Location Spoofing Attack. This will introduce serious interference to the PUs. In this study, we identify a new kind of attack coined as location cheating attack. To thwart this attack, we propose a novel infrastructure-based approach to provide privacy-preserving location proof. With the proposed solution, the database can verify the locations without knowing the user’s accurate location. Experimental results show that our approach, besides providing location proofs effectively, can significantly improve the user’s location privacy.