Game Analysis of Trilateral Interests in Cooperative Governance of Mixed Ownership Enterprises in China

Abstract

This article focuses on the process of the interest game among the government, enterprises and other stakeholders in the governance of mixed ownership in China from the perspective of collaborative governance, constructs a game model among the three and analyzes and Interprets the solution of the model, providing a decision-making basis for the optimization and management of mixed ownership enterprises. The study finds that under the mechanism of collaborative governance, the government and enterprises still have collusion motives for the consideration of interests, which undermines the interests of other stakeholders, undermines the synergy among the three at the same time weakens the synergies. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the supervision capacity of other stakeholders and give full play to its supervisory role; improve the mechanism of corporate information disclosure, strengthen the mechanism of corporate restraint and reduce the risk of conspiracies between government and enterprises; clarify the government’s status, draw a “red line” of government participation in corporate governance, so as to prevent “secret collusion” between government and enterprises, safeguard the rights and interests of other stakeholders, and ultimately establish an effective governance mechanism for mixed ownership enterprises so as to maximize synergies among enterprises.