Modal Skepticism. Philosophical Thought Experiments and Modal Epistemology

Abstract

In their paper, \textquoteleft{}When are thought experiments poor ones?\textquoteright (Peijnenburg and Atkinson 2003), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are \textquotedblleft{}poor\textquotedblright ones with \textquotedblleft{}disastrous consequences\textquotedblright and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more \textquotedblleft{}recherché\textquotedblright thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical.