The modern presidency is one of administration, where presidents seek to further their own agendas by directing administrative behavior throughout the executive branch. Yet little research explores how executive agencies organize their policy processes in response to publicly articulated presidential priorities. Using two novel datasets that allow us to examine the regulatory priorities of presidents and how executive agencies organize their rulemaking processes, we find that executive agencies respond to presidential policy preferences by centralizing policymaking to the top of an agency's hierarchy, placing regulation in the hands of political appointees.
CITATION STYLE
Selin, J. L., Drolc, C. A., Butcher, J., Brothers, N. L., & Brant, H. K. (2022). Under Pressure: Centralizing Regulation in Response to Presidential Priorities. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 52(2), 340–366. https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12764
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