I argue for a formal specification as a working understanding of ‘computational creativity’. Geraint A. Wiggins proposed a formalised framework for ‘computational creativity’, based on Margaret Boden’s view of ‘creativity’ defined as searches in concept spaces. I argue that the epistemological basis for delineated ‘concept spaces’ is problematic: instead of Wiggins’s bounded types or sets, such theoretical spaces can represent traces of creative output. To address this problem, I propose a revised specification which includes dynamic concept spaces, along with formalisations of memory and motivations, which allow iteration in a time-based framework that can be aligned with learning models (e.g., John Dewey’s experiential model). This supports the view of computational creativity as product of a learning process. My critical revision of the framework, applied to the case of computer systems that improvise music, achieves a more detailed specification and better understanding of potentials in computational creativity.
CITATION STYLE
Mogensen, R. (2018). Dynamic Concept Spaces in Computational Creativity for Music. In Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (Vol. 44, pp. 57–68). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96448-5_7
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