In this paper we present two attacks that exploit cache events, which are visible in some side channel, to derive a secret key used in an implementation of AES. The first is an improvement of an adaptive chosen plaintext attack presented at ACISP 2006. The second is a new known plaintext attack that can recover a 128-bit key with approximately 30 measurements to reduce the number of key hypotheses to 230. This is comparable to classical Differential Power Analysis; however, our attacks are able to overcome certain masking techniques. We also show how to deal with unreliable cache event detection in the real-life measurement scenario and present practical explorations on a 32-bit ARM microprocessor. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Gallais, J. F., Kizhvatov, I., & Tunstall, M. (2011). Improved trace-driven cache-collision attacks against embedded AES implementations. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6513 LNCS, pp. 243–257). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17955-6_18
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