Human agency and the resources of reason

Abstract

The evidence shows that human primates become (relatively) rational actors. Using a distributed perspective, we identify aspects of human agency that raise important questions for sociocognitive science. In humans, we argue, agency does not centre on individual agents. Cognitive, social and linguistic outcomes depend on skills in moving in and out of aggregates that bind people, artifacts, language and institutions. While recognising the value of symbol processing models, these presuppose the embodied events of human symbol grounding. At a micro level, humans coordinate with others and the world to self-construct by cognising, talking and orienting to social affordances. We trace the necessary skills to sense-saturated coordination or interactivity. As a result of perceiving and acting on the environment, human individuals use the artificial to extend their natural powers. By using verbal patterns, artifacts and institutions, we become imperfect rational actors whose lives span the micro and the macro worlds.