Essentialist Metaphysics in a Scientific Framework

Abstract

In Section 1, the subject of the article is presented: the prospect of integrating an essentialist metaphysics into the scientific enterprise. Section 2 collects together a number of claims which are characteristic of essentialism. A species of inference rules, called (PFE)-rules, is introduced, referring to an idea of E. Hirsch's. Supplementing classical logic by the conditional schemes corresponding to a choice of such rules yields a first order theory of which it is claimed that it can be used as the core of an essentialist metaphysical theory. Section 3 presents a definition of a property's essentially belonging to an individual. Chiefly in Sections 4 and 5, it is shown in detail how essentialism as described in Section 2 can be based on this definition and a system of (PFE)-rules. In order to completely achieve this end, Section 5 additionally presents a recursive refinement of the original concept of essential belonging. The article concludes by sketching, in Section 6, the role of empirical research work in the formation of systems of (PFE)-rules.