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Automated unbounded verification of security protocols

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (2002) 2404 324-337
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-45657-0_24
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Abstract

We present a new model for automated verification of security protocols, permitting the use of an unbounded number of protocol runs. We prove its correctness, completeness and also that it terminates. It has been implemented and its efficiency is clearly shown by the number of protocols successfully studied. In particular, we present an attack previously unreported on the Denning-Sacco symmetric key protocol.

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Chevalier, Y., & Vigneron, L. (2002). Automated unbounded verification of security protocols. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 2404, pp. 324–337). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45657-0_24

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