A rational delegating computation protocol based on reputation and smart contract

1Citations
Citations of this article
6Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

The delegating computation has become an irreversible trend, together comes the pressing need for fairness and efficiency issues. To solve this problem, we leverage game theory to propose a smart contract-based solution. First, according to the behavioral preferences of the participants, we design an incentive contract to describe the motivation of the participants. Next, to satisfy the fairness of the rational delegating computation, we propose a rational delegating computation protocol based on reputation and smart contract. More specifically, rational participants are to gain the maximum utility and reach the Nash equilibrium in the protocol. Besides, we design a reputation mechanism with a reputation certificate, which measures the reputation from multiple dimensions. The reputation is used to assure the client’s trust in the computing party to improve the efficiency of the protocol. Then, we conduct a comprehensive experiment to evaluate the proposed protocol. The simulation and analysis results show that the proposed protocol solves the complex traditional verification problem. We also conduct a feasibility study that involves implementing the contracts in Solidity and running them on the official Ethereum network. Meanwhile, we prove the fairness and correctness of the protocol.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Ma, J., Chen, Y., Wang, Z., Liu, G., & Zhu, H. (2021). A rational delegating computation protocol based on reputation and smart contract. Journal of Cloud Computing, 10(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13677-021-00267-1

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free