Emotion, autonomy, and weakness of will

Abstract

Acting autonomously is guiding one’s actions via reasons. Challenging traditional views, some philosophers have recently claimed that agents can guide their actions via reasons while acting against their better judgement. According to these philosophers, there are cases of so-called inverse akrasia, defined as cases in which the agent acts rationally and even morally but does so against his better judgement. The standard example is that of Huckleberry Finn who gives in to his emotions when he protects the fugitive slave Jim from the slave hunters instead of holding to his original resolve to turn Jim in. I argue that rational in the sense of autonomous action must always be authorised by judgement. This is not to say, however, that all rational action must be authorised by inference and deliberative reflection. Nor is it to say that agents ought to attempt to bar their emotions from interfering with their judgements. Such an attempt would be both hopeless and counterproductive. Judgements supply us with what we see as reasons, whereas ideal agents act for what really are reasons. In tracking normative reasons, the emotions do very well indeed. Therefore, what we ought to do is to cultivate our emotions over time. On-going cultivation of our emotions is essential for us humans in order to gain and improve our practical knowledge.