Philosophers investigating the interpretation and use of conditional sentences have long been intrigued by the intuitive correspondence between the probability of a conditional ‘if A, then C’ and the conditional probability of C, given A. Attempts to account for this intuition within a general probabilistic theory of belief, meaning and use have been plagued by a danger of trivialization, which has proven to be remarkably recalcitrant and absorbed much of the creative effort in the area. But there is a strategy for avoiding triviality that has been known for almost as long as the triviality results themselves. What is lacking is a straightforward integration of this approach in a larger framework of belief representation and dynamics. This paper discusses some of the issues involved and proposes an account of belief update by conditionalization.
CITATION STYLE
Kaufmann, S. (2015). Conditionals, Conditional Probabilities, and Conditionalization. In Language, Cognition, and Mind (Vol. 2, pp. 71–94). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17064-0_4
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