Epistemic Humility, Defeat, and a Defense of Moderate Skepticism

Abstract

This chapter will argue for a moderate form of skepticism. Moderate skepticism is the view that human beings know far less than is normally credited to them. Although I believe Peter Klein has refuted a radical form of skepticism that serves as familiar fodder for philosophical debate, the moderate form of skepticism I defend here is immune to Klein’s objections. This form of skepticism is not only plausible and interesting, but I believe it is supported by an argument with premises Klein ought to accept. My argument for moderate skepticism will rely on a defeasibility analysis of knowledge, an evidentialist theory of epistemic justification, the fact that we all suffer from epistemic limitations, and the claim that epistemic humility is a virtue. The argument maintains that when it comes to the important and interesting questions human beings ponder, we all suffer from epistemic limitations including insufficient evidence, imperfectly reliable memories, cognitive biases, epistemic peers who disagree with us, and underdeveloped cognitive skills. For the vast majority of human beings, these limitations serve as defeaters that undermine our capacity to know many of the things we wonder about and investigate. The virtue of epistemic humility requires us to be honest about our epistemic shortcomings and to embrace moderate skepticism and all that it suggests about learning, teaching, communicating, civil discourse, and the pursuit of wisdom.