Lithuania

Abstract

This chapter describes the structure and main principles of the Lithuanian Constitution of 1992, including the 2004 constitutional reform, which laid down the constitutional basis of Lithuania’s membership of the EU. It observes that due to their bitter historical struggle for statehood, Lithuanians have generally treated membership of the EU as a fundamental geopolitical choice. This point of view is reflected by the Constitution, which extensively opened the constitutional order to EU membership, while a separate constitutional act prohibits joining any union based on the former USSR. This could be one of the reasons of limited discussions both in academia and in the public discourse concerning various issues decided at the EU level, which later have had a profound impact upon implementation at the national level. The chapter provides an analysis of the constitutional reforms paving the way for Lithuania’s accession to the EMU, including an (unsuccessful) request to hold a referendum on the adoption of the euro on the ground that the nature of the EMU had been changed by the ESM Treaty, due to the extensive financial liabilities it might entail. Further, the legal and factual context in which the Fiscal Compact Treaty was ratified, as well as jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania, related to judicial review of macroeconomic policy formation and implementation measures, is explained. Finally, the chapter explores the constitutional limits for further fiscal, economic and monetary integration. It argues that further prospects of such integration depend very much on a deeper sense of mutual trust and solidarity of the EU citizens, which, in turn, is predetermined by the compliance with the EU regulatory framework and accountability of decision-making. From the point of view of the Lithuanian Constitution, the EU friendly jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court should prove open enough to embrace future changes at the EU level. Still, substantial limitations of the constitutional budgetary powers of the Lithuanian parliament, which are treated as a reflection of the principle of (national) democracy, may require constitutional amendments.